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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This being an appeal from conviction of a first degree 
felony, inter alia, the Supreme Court is granted original appel-
late jurisdiction over this case oy Section 78-2-2 U.C.A., 
(1953), as amended, subject to referral to the Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
FIRST TSSDE: whether Defendant was denied the effective-
assistance of counsel by the Court's allowing Defendant's origi-
nal counsel to withdraw nineteen (19) days before trial and by 
the Court's appointment of the public defender to represent 
Defendant without allowing sufficient time for the public defend-
er to prepare for trial. 
Standard of Appellate Review: This issue presents a ques-
tion of law which is reviewable without deference to the findings 
or rulings of the trial court. Western Kane Company Special 
Service District #1 v. Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P.2d 1376. 
SECOND ISSUE: Whether the Defendant's trial attorney's acos 
and omissions fall below the standard of effective assistance or 
counsel and Defendant was thus denied effective assistance of 
counsel. 
Standard of Appellate Review: This issue presents a ques-
tion of law, which the Appellate Court should determine witnout 
giving special weight to findings or rulings in the record. This 
issue also presents questions of fact, some of which are not 
found in the trial record, and the Court should determine if the 
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issue should be remanded to the Trial Court for an evidentiary 
hearing on this issue. cf . Fernandez v. Cook, r?83 P. 2d 547 
(Utah 1989). 
THIRD TSSUE: Whether the failure of the court to sever 
Count V of the Information, POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A RE-
STRICTED PERSON, which requires proof of the Defendant's prior 
felony convictions, constitutes reversible error. 
Standard of Appellate Review: This matter was not ruled 
upon in the Trial Court, but the I rial Court, should have tf.f.en it 
upon itself to sever this count. The Court's failure constitutes 
manifest error, and this Court should review the record and make 
its determination as to whether this error is so prejudicial that 
the Defendant is entitled to reversal as a matter of law. State 
v_z_ Cobo, *50 P.2d 952, 958 (1936). (See Justice Stewart1s Dis-
sent, State v. Bullock, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 38). The question 
is one of law, whether Rule 9 (d) U.R.Cr.P. requires the Trial 
Court to sever even though no motion is made by counsel, and is 
subject to determination by this Court on the basis of the record 
alone. 
FOURTH ISSUE: Did the Trial Court err in allowing the jury 
to consider constructive possession, as opposed to actual posses-
sion of a firearm, as an aggravating element in the crime of 
Aggravated Burglary? 
Standard of Appellate Review: This issue requires an inter-
r> 
pretation of Section 76-6-203, U.C.A., (1953), as amended, and is 
therefore reviewable without deference to the trial court's 
rulings. State v. Chindgren. 777 P.2d 527. 
FIFTH ISSUE: Was the Defendant denied a fair trial by the 
misconduct of the prosecutor? 
Standard of Appellate Review: Defendant asserts that the 
prosecutor's improper introduction of exhibits and misrepresenta-
tion of the evidence to the jury on closing argument had a preju-
dicial effect on the jury. This issue presents a question of law 
and the Appellate Court should determine the issue from the 
record since no findings of fact were entered by a trial court. 
SIXTH ISSUE: Was Defendant/Appellant denied a fair trial by 
the Prosecutor's improper introduction of exhibits, purported to 
be "burglary tools" and the Trial Court's error in admitting such 
exhibits into evidence and placing them before the jury over 
defense counsel's objection? 
Standard of Appellate Review: The Trial Court's ruling on 
admissibility of evidence should be upheld unless it is clearly 
erroneous. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND ROLES 
Amendments to the Constituta on of the United States 
Amendment V: No person shall be held to answer for a 
capita], or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces, or in the militia, when in aex.ua] service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall oe compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself. nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
Amendment VI: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall "nave 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause cf the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
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Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the naxure 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public xrial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), Section 76-1-401 
In this part unless the context requires a different defini-
tion, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is close-
ly related in time and is incident xo an attempt or an accom-
plishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify 
the effect of Section 77-21-31 in controlling the joinder of 
offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), Section 76-2-202 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
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commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct which constitutors an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), Section 76-6-203 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in at-
tempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary, the actor or 
another participant in the crime*. 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the 
crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or 
dangerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the 
same definition as under Section 76-1-601. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), Section 77-14-2 
(1) A defendant, whether or not written demand has been 
made, who intends to offer evidence of an alibi shall, not less 
than ten (10) days before trial, or at such other time as the 
court may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting attorney a 
notice, in writing, of his intention to claim alibi. The notice 
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shall contain specific information as to the place where the 
defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense 
and, as particularly as is known to the defendant or his attor-
ney, the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom he proposes 
to establish alibi. The prosecuting attorney, not more than five 
(5) days after receipt of the list provided herein or at such 
other time as the court may direct, shall file and serve the 
defendant with the addresses, as particularly as are known to him 
of the witnesses the state proposes to offer to contradict or 
impeach the defendant's alibi evidence. 
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney shall be under a 
continuing duty to disclose the names and addresses or additional 
witnesses which come to the attention of either party after 
filing their alibi witness lists. 
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney fails to comply 
with the requirements of this section, the court may exclude 
evidence offered to establish or rebut alibi. However, the 
defendant may always testify on his own behalf concerning alibi. 
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, waive the require-
ments of this section. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9 
(a) Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indict-
ment or information in a separate count for each offense if the 
offenses charged arise out of a criminal episode as defined in 
section 76-1-401, U.C.A., (1953), as amended. A felony offense 
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and a misdemeanor offense may be charged in t:ie same indictment 
cf information if: 
(1) they arise out of a criminal episode, and 
(2) the defendant is afforded a preliminary uearing 
with respect to the misdemeanor along with the felrmy of-
fense . 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same 
indictment of information if they are alleged to have participat-
ed in the same act or conduct or in the same criminal episode. 
Such defendants ra<-y be charged in one or more coants 
together or separately and all of the defendants need not be 
charged in each count. 
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with 
any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the court in its 
discretion, on motion or otherwise, orders separate? trials con-
sistent with the interests of justice. 
(ci The court may order two or more indictments or informa-
tions or both, to be tried together if the offenses and the 
defendants, if there is more than one, could have besen joined in 
a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the 
same as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or 
information. 
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the prosecution is 
prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants, in an indict-
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ment or information, or by a joinder for trial together, the 
court shall order an election of separate trials of separate 
counts, or grant a severance of defendants, or provide such other 
relief as justice requires. 
A defendant's right to severance of offenses or 
defendants is waived if the motion is not made at least five (5) 
days before trial. In ruling on a motion by defendant for 
severance, the court may order the prosecutor to disclose any 
statements made by the defendant which he intends to introduce m 
evidence at the trial. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12 
(a) An application to tne court for an order shall be by 
motion. A motion other than one made during a trial or hearing 
shall be in writing unless the court otherwise permits. It shall 
state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and 
shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported by affi-
davit or by evidence. 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request 
for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of 
determination without the trial of the general issue, may be 
raised prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be 
raised at least five (5) days prior to the trial: 
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the 
indictment or information other than that it fails to show 
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jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which 
objection shall be noticed by the court at any time during 
the pendency of the proceeding; 
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of evidence; 
(3) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants 
under Rule 9; or 
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeop-
ardy . . . c, d, e, f, g (2) (3) (4). 
Rules of Judicial Administration 1988, Rule 4-604 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for withdrawal of 
counsel in criminal cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to ail trial courts of record and 
not of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) An attorney may withdraw as counsel of record in 
all cases except where withdrawal may result In a delay of 
the trial or prejudice to the client. In those cases, an 
attorney may not withdraw without the approval of the court. 
(2) A motion to withdraw as an attorney in a criminal 
case shall be made in open court with the defendant present 
unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, along with the Co-Defendant, was tried on 
four (4) counts of Aggravated Burglary, Possession of a Dangerous 
Weapon by an Unauthorised Person, Possession of an Instrument for 
Burglary or Theft and four (4) counts of Theft, The two Defend-
ants were also charged with being Habitual Criminals, although 
after the jury returned its verdict on those charges that went to 
the jury, the prosecutor elected to not proceed with the prosecu-
tion of being an Habitual Criminal. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
The criminal violations are alleged to have occurred on June 
2, 1989, in Emery County, Utah. The Defendants were arrested and 
placed ±n the Emery County Jail on that day, and an Information, 
charging the Defendants with ten (10) criminal counts was filed 
on June 8, 1989. 
The Defendants were unable to post bail, and on June 29, 
1989, Preliminary Hearing was held on an amended Information 
containing ten (10) criminal counts and an eleventh (11th) count 
of being an Habitual Criminal. Defendants were represented by 
their private attorney, and the Court, on June 30, 1989, issued a 
memorandum decision binding all counts over to the District Court 
for Emery County, State of Utah, for further proceedings. On 
July 6, 1989, the Defendants were arraigned in District Court and 
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entered "Not Guilty" pleas. Trial was set for September 25 and 
26, 1989. 
On August 17, 1989, the attorney for the Defendants filed a 
Motion to Withdraw, along with a Motion for trie matter to be set 
for hearing on September 6, 1989. On September 6, 1939, the 
Defendants and their counsel appeared before the Seventh Judicial 
District Court for a hearing on counsel's Motion to Withdraw. 
The Court issued an order granting counsel's Motion to Withdraw 
and appointed the Public Defender for Emery County to represent 
the Defendants in the September 25 and 26, 1989 trial. 
On September 21, 1989, four (4) days before trial, the 
recently appointed counsel for Defendants filed a Motion and 
Affidavit in support thereof, to vacate the trial setting of 
September 25 and 26, 1989, on the grounds that he had just 
learned of the existence of possible alibi witnesses and needed 
additional time to locate them and give the statutory notice of 
an alibi defense. The Court denied this motion. 
Trial was held on September 25 and 26, 1989. The 
Defendant/Appellant was found guilty of nine (9) counts, and 
after the jury returned its verdicts, the prosecutor elected not 
to proceed with the Habitual Criminal charge. The Court then 
sentenced Defendant to be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
At 4:08 a.m. on June 2, 1989, Deputy Sheriff, Laury Hansen, 
was patrolling Emery County on Utah Highway 10, when the alarm 
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system in Ferron Drug Store went off and was received over Deputy 
Hansen's radio frequency. (Trial Transcript, pgs. 62-63). 
Deputy Hansen immediately proceeded south toward the town of 
Ferron, while at the same time Deputy Robert Blackburn was called 
from his home in Ferron to respond to the same call. (T. 52-53). 
As Deputy Blackburn proceeded north on Highway U-10 in the direc-
tion of Ferron Drug Store, according to his trial testimony, he 
saw the glare of headlights coming in his direction traveling 
form north to south. (T. 53~54). He saw an orange and white 
Scout International with Colorado plates speeding through the 
darkness past him. (T. 55). He testified that he had to slow 
down in order to get a description of the vehicle and that it was 
traveling at a faster~than~normal speed. (T. 54). He testified 
that he passed the vehicle at approximately 4:14 a.m. His first 
observation of the venicle was only to see the glare of its 
lights as it traveled south in his direction, and although when 
he first observed it, the vehicle was in the north part of Fer-
ron, where Ferron Drug Store is located, he did not actually see 
the vehicle stopped at Ferron Drug Store or at any other location 
along Highway U-10. (T. 53-55). 
Although Deputy Blackburn's testimony was that his initial 
reaction was to stop the vehicle, he proceeded to Ferron Drug 
Store where he spent the next nine (9) minutes checking the 
property. (T. 55-56). It was only after those nine (9) minutes 
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elapsed, that he and Deputy Hansen, who had then arrived on the 
scene, put out a call to Deputy Sheriff J.D. Mangum, who was at 
his home in the town of Emery, located fifteen (15) miles south 
of Ferron. (T. 66-67) . 
Deputy Mangum testified he stopped Co-Defendant Seei's 
vehicle at 4:27 a.m. at Mile Post 14.3 (sic), eight (8) miles 
north of Emery. (T. 66-67). Deputy Hansen testified that when 
he arrived at the scene of the stop, that the vehicle was stopped 
two (2) miles north of the town of Emery. (T. 64). Deputy 
Mangum stopped the first vehicle he encountered, as it was ap-
proaching him, and that vehicle turned out to match the descrip-
tion of an orange and white Scout International that Deputy 
Blackburn claimed he had seen leaving the town of Ferron at a 
higher-than-normal rate of speed thirteen (13) minutes earlier. 
If Deputy Mangum's testimony is correct, and he did stop the Co-
Defendant eight (8) miles north of the town of Emery, Co-
Defendant's average rate of speed would have been 32.3 miles per 
hour over the course of the seven (7) miles traveled. 
When Deputy Mangum approached the stopped vehicle, Co-De-
fendant/Appellant Seel attempted to exit the vehicle to walk back 
to Deputy Mangum, but according to Deputy Mangum's testimony, he 
told the Co-Defendant to remain in the vehicle. (T. 67-68). 
Through the predawn darkness, Deputy Mangum claimed in this 
testimony, that he was able to observe many items in the vehicle 
that appeared "new" to him. (T. 68). There is no testimony as 
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to whether he used the assistance of artificial light in looking 
into the interior of the vehicle, but at the hour of 4:27 a.m., 
it appears reasonable that the items in the vehicle were not in 
plain view and Deputy Mangum needed the use of artificial light 
in order to begin a visual search of the vehicle. 
Upon Deputy Hansen's arrival, he and Deputy Mangum placed 
the two occupants of the vehicle under arrest and secured the 
vehicle. (T. 74). The vehicle was then towed to the town of 
Ferron, where a more thorough search was conducted and photo-
graphs were taken of the interior of the vehicle. (T. 71-73). 
Exhibit 1-A is a photograph taken at approximately 6:00 a.m. on 
June 2nd, and is a picture taken of the interior of the vehicle 
with the passenger door open. (T. 72 and 76-77). Later that 
day, after further examination of the vehicle, the Emery County 
Sheriff's Department obtained a search warrant to search the 
vehicle. The search warrant authorized law enforcement officers 
to search the vehicle, but did not authorise them to search the 
briefcase found within the vehicle. That briefcase was neverthe-
less opened and found to contain a loaded firearm. (T. 70-71). 
Subsequently, both occupants were charged with four (4) counts of 
Aggravated Burglary, four (4) counts of Theft, one (1) count of 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, and one 
(1) count of Possession of Burglary Tools. Just prior to the 
Preliminary Hearing, the State filed an amended Information in 
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which an additional count of Being an Habitual Criminal was 
added. 
The Defendants retained the legal services of Mark H. 
Tanner, Attorney at Law, with offices in Castle Dale, Utah. Mr. 
Tanner represented the Defendants in the Preliminarj?" Hearing and 
then on August 17, 19S9, filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel 
for the Defendants. That Moxion was heard on September 6, 1989, 
nineteen (19) days before trial, and Judge Boyd Bunnell, Seventh 
Judicial District Court Judge, granted Mr. Tanner's Motion to 
Withdraw. 
On that same day, Judge Bunnell then appointed Allen Thorpe, 
the Emery County Defender, to represent both Defendants in the 
trial which was set for September 25-26, 1989. Mr Thorpe did 
not understand the complexity of the case, nor was he aware of 
the extent of the charges against the Defendants. Although he 
already had two (2) jury trials scheduled between September 6th 
and September 25th, 1989, he assumed thax he would be able to 
prepare for all of them. The first jury trial scheduled for Mr. 
Thorpe after September 6th did not go to trial because the de-
fendant agreed to enter a plea just prior to the beginning of the 
trial. Following the second trial scheduled for Mr. Thorpe 
during that period, Mr. Thorpe visited the Defendants for the 
first time on the afternoon of September 20, 1989, a Wednesday. 
It was only then that he discovered what defenses the Defendants 
had and became aware of the problems inherent in defending the 
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case. (See Affidavit in Support of Motion to Vacate). 
On September 21, 1989, Mr. Thorpe filed a Motion to Vacate 
and supported that Motion with an Affidavit. In the Affidavit, 
Mr. Thorpe informed the Court that he had not met with the De-
fendants until September 20th and would not be able to adequately 
prepare their defense in the time remaining before the coming 
trial, scheduled for Monday, September 25th. Judge Bunnell 
denied the Motion and the trial proceeded as scheduled. 
On the first day of trial, Defendants * counsel filed a 
Notice of Alibi Defense in behalf of the Defendants, and was not 
precluded from presenting an alibi defense. However, because Mr. 
Thorpe did not even meet with the Defendants until approximately 
three (3) working days before trial, Mr. Thorpe was unable to 
locate or contact the persons the Defendants claimed would be 
able to establish an alibi for them and so they were unable to 
raise the alibi defense without taking the witness stand them-
selves. Neither were they able to present corroborating witness-
es in support of their claim that they were in Price, Utah, 
approximately forty (40) miles from Ferron, at 3:00 a.m., June 2, 
1989. (T. 173). That evidence would have established an alibi 
for the Defendants because Deputy Sheriff Kyle Ekker, a detective 
for the Emery County Sheriff's Office, testified that his inves-
tigation of the burglary showed that the burglary of Jeanie's 
Convenience Store and Gas Station located in Ferron, had occurred 
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no later than 3:16 a.m. on June 2nd. (T. 99). 
The State began its case with an opening statement, followed 
by calling various deputy sheriffs as witnesses. After the 
State's fourth witness had completed direct and cross-examina-
tion, and had been allowed to step down, counsel for the Defend-
ants realized that the Spate's witnesses were conferring with 
each other concerning the testimony being presented before the 
Court and moved the Court to have all further potential witnesses 
excluded from the courtroom. (T. 81). Following the exclusion 
of the witnesses, the State then called two more deputy sheriffs 
to testify and then called as witnesses, the four proprietors of 
the four businesses that had been burglarized. Then the State 
rested its case. (T. 152). 
After the State rested, counsel for the Defendants moved the 
Court to dismiss the four (4) burglary counts or reduce them to 
Third Degree Felonies for Burglary of Non-Dwellings, arguing that 
there was no showing that the Defendants were armed with a deadly 
weapon or attempted to use a deadly weapon in attempting, commit-
ting or fleeing from the burglaries. (T. 153). He also moved to 
dismiss Count V as to Defendant Lemon, arguing that both Defend-
ants could not be charged with possession of the firearm because 
it did not belong to both of them and moved to reduce the level 
of three (3) of the theft counts because the values of the 
property stolen had not established the level of the crimes 
charged. (T. 153-154). 
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The Court did not grant Defendant's motion regarding the 
four (4) Aggravated Burglary counts, but did dismiss the charge 
of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by an unauthorized person as 
to each Defendant. (T. 161). Then the Court, on its own motion, 
dismissed Count VI, which charged the Defendants with Possession 
of an Instrument of Burglary or Theft, finding that the State had 
failed to show that any of the exhibits introduced as being 
burglary tools are commonly used in the burglary business. (T. 
161-162). Interestingly, when Mr. Thorpe had earlier objected to 
the State's so called "burglary tools" being admitted into evi-
dence, the Court overruled Mr. Thorpe's objection and admitted 
the tools into evidence, allowing them to be placed before the 
jury during the presentation of the remainder of the State's 
case. (T. 103-106). Mr. Thorpe's objection to the admission of 
those tools as evidence of possession of burglary tools was based 
upon the same argument the judge adopted in dismissing Count VI. 
Subsequently, when the prosecutor was making his closing argu-
ments, even though Count VI was dismissed, the prosecutor brought 
the allegation of the burglary tools before the jury, telling 
them that "there were burglary tools in the Scout." (T. 213, 
Line 24). 
After the Court had ruled on Mr. Thorpe's motions, the 
prosecutor asked to be allowed to respond to the Court's rulings. 
He first argued that he presented sufficient evidence to show 
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that the tools m thf possession of the Defendants were burglary-
tools, but the Court was not persuaded by his arguments and let 
its ruling stand. (T. 162-164). 
The prosecutor then asked the Court to allow the State to 
reopen with respect, to the Defendants' knowledge of the weapon 
being in the briefcase. (T. 164). The Court* then allowed the 
State to reopen, and introduce new evidence, not alluded to in 
its case in chief, that Defendant/Appellant Seel knew that the 
weapon was in the briefcase. (T. 166). After the State again 
rested, counsel for the Defendants then called Defendant/Appel-
lant Seel to testify. (T. 170). (Defendant Lemon elected not to 
take the witness stand and testify). Following completion of De-
fendant Seel's testimony, the Court adjourned for the day, ex-
cused the jury and then, out of the jury's presence, ruled that 
Count V, previously dismissed as to both Defendants, was then 
dismissed only as it applied to Mr. Lemon, but reinstituted the 
Count as it applied to Defendant/Appellant Seel. (T. 183). 
At the completion of the presentation of all evidence, the 
jury returned verdicts of guilty on all nine (9) remaining counts 
against the Defendant. The Court then asked the prosecutor if 
the State wanted to proceed on the further allegation of Being an 
Habitual Criminal, and the prosecutor informed the Court that the 
State did not wish to proceed with that Count. Defendant Lemon 
was subsequently sentenced to be imprisoned in the Utah State 
Prison. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
FIRST ISSUE: The Defendant was denied effective assistance 
of counsel when the trial judge allowed Defendant's private 
attorney to withdraw nineteen (19) days before trial and appoint-
ed the public defender to represent Defendants without vacating 
the trial date and resetting the matter for a later date. The 
Court's own calendar showed that the public defender already had 
two (2) District Court jury trials scheduled during that nineteen 
(19) day period and certainly could have assumed that defense 
counsel had other court settings and obligations scheduled, as 
well. The public defender did not have the benefit of sitting 
through the Preliminary Hearing and knew nothing of a case in-
cluding ten (10) criminal counts and requiring two (2) days of 
trial. Defense Counsel filed a Motion to Vacate Trial on Septem-
ber 21, 1989, and that Motion was improperly denied by the Court. 
SECOND ISSUE: Neither Defendant was able to post bail and 
both were held in the Emt±ry County Jail until trial. They were 
unable to visit the public defender and he did not visit or talk 
with either Defendant until the afternoon of September 20, 1989, 
leaving three (3) working days before trial. It was too late by 
then, for defense counsel to file Motions to Suppress the evi-
dence and to sever Count V and to serve notice of the alibi 
defense. More importantly, defense counsel did not have enough 
time to locate, interview and subpoena the Defendants5 alibi 
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witnesses. Defense counsel failed to move to vacate in a timely 
manner and failed to locate, interview and subpoena alibi wit-
nesses prior to trial. 
At trial, defense counsel failed to object to the reading of 
the criminal records of the Defendants, failed to exclude 
witnesses at the beginning of trial, and failed to object to the 
prosecutor's misstatements of evidence to the jury during closing 
argument. 
THIRD ISSUE: Count V of the Information, POSSESSION OF A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED PERSON, was improperly joined 
with the other counts in the Information, because it was not 
incident to the single criminal episode of the other counts as 
required by Section 76-1-401, U.C.A., (1953), as amended, and did 
not arise out of a single criminal episode. Evidence to support 
the count would have been inadmissible and prejudicial and the 
jury would not have been made aware that Defendant had a prior 
criminal history. 
The Court, pursuant to Rule 9 (d) O.R.Cr.P., should have 
severed Count V without a motion from Defendants to do so, and 
the Court's fai'lure to sever, denied Defendants their right to 
due process of law. 
The Court ruled that there wasn't any evidence that 
Defendant Lemon had any knowledge of the presence of a firearm in 
the vehicle and dismissed Count V, as to him. Because Defendant 
Lemon did not know of the existence of a firearm, it was impossi-
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ble for him to have the necessary "mental state" required by 
Section 76-2-202, U.C.A., (1953), as amended, to be an accomplice 
to the aggravated aspect of Counts I-IV. 
FOURTH ISSUE: Constructive possession of a firearm is not 
an aggravating element in the crime of aggravated robbery. If it 
were, general use of the word "possession" could even be used to 
include weapons that are not in the immediate presence of the 
Defendant. Section 76-6-203, U.C.A., (1953), as amended, denotes 
"use" of a weapon in some manner while committing or fleeing from 
a burglary, such as "uses", "threatens" or "attempts to use". 
The word "poss^ses", preceded and followed by the disjunctive 
"or" indicates legislative intent that the word "possesses" be of 
equal gravity with the words and phrases "uses", "threatens", 
"attempts to use", and does not include circumstances where a 
weapon is never even held by a defendant and plays no part in the 
defendant's activities in attempting, committing or fleeing from 
a burglary. 
FIFTH ISSUE: The prosecutor argued facts not in evidence, 
told the jury the Defendants possessed "burglary tools", even 
though Count VI was dismissed by the Court after the State rest-
ed, and misstated the testimony of some witnesses. Although 
defense counsel did not make any objections, the prosecutor's 
statements may have prejudiced the jury and it was manifest or 
plain error for the Court to fail to correct the prosecutor and 
aan'Onish the jury to disregard the prosecutor's improper
 truate-
nv_ nts. 
SIXTH ISSUE: The Court erred in admitting Exhibits 11-19 as 
burglary tools over defense counsel's objection. The prosecutor 
failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the exhib-
its into evidence as burglary tools or as evidence of their use 
in the burglaries charged in the Information. After the tools 
were placed in view of the jury as "burglary tools", and after 
the State rested, the Court, upon its own motion, dismissed Jount 
VI, POSSESSION OF AN INSTRUMENT FOR BURGLARY OR THEFT, stating 
that the State had not presented any evidence to support Count 
VI. No evidence having been presented to support Count VI, the 
Court erred in admitting Exhibits 11-19, and prejudiced the jury 
in so doing. 
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
FTRST ISSUE: Tn the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
Rule 4-604 governs withdrawal of counsel in criminal cases. That 
rule provides that an attorney may not withdraw without the 
approval of the Court and must make his motion to withdraw in 
open court with the defendant present. Even then, he may not 
withdraw if his withdrawal will result in a delay of the triax or 
prejudice to the client. It would seem that it is within the 
sound discretion of the court to decide whether counsel should be 
allowed to withdraw or not. The Court's decision generally is 
not disturbed absent showing that it is clearly erroneous. 
In the present case, Defendant and the Co-Defendant retained 
private counsel to represent them. That Counsel was present at 
the Preliminary Hearing and at the Arraignment in the District 
Court where the Defendants entered "Not Guilty" pleas and trial 
was set for September 25-26, 1989. Approximately six (6) weeks 
after arraignment, counsel for the Defendants filed a Motion to 
Withdraw and during the Court's regularly scheduled Law and 
Motion Calendar day on September 6, 1939, the Court heard 
counsel's motion and allowed counsel to withdraw, knowing that 
the case contained four (4) First Degree Felony charges and 
several other felony and misdemeanor charges and included an 
Habitual Criminal count. After allowing the private counsel to 
withdraw, the Court appointed the public defender, even though 
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the Court was aware or should have been aware that the public 
defender had two (2) felony jury trials scheduled between ohe 
date of appointment and the date of the xrial in this matter. 
(See Appendix). The Coup's calendar was before it and the Court 
should have also been sensitive "co the probability that the 
public defender had other court settings and obligations sched-
uled during that period, as well. 
The public defender completed a District Court jury trial on 
September 19, 1989, and then, on September 20, 1989, he visited 
Defendant/Appellant and the Co-Defendant for the first time. It 
was immediately apparent to him that he was going to be unable to 
provide effective assistance of counsel to the Defendants if the 
trial was held as scheduled.. On September 21, 1989, the public 
defender filed a Motion to Vacate and an Affidavit in Support of 
that motion. In the Affidavit, the public defender stated that 
he had met with the Defendants on September 20, 1989 and only 
then discovered they had an alibi defense that needed to be 
prepared for. (See Affidavit in the Appendix). By then, it was 
already to late for him to comply with the statutory time limits 
for filing a Motion to Suppress Evidence (See Rule 12, 
U.R.Cr.P.), or to file a Motion to Sever (See Rule 3, U.R.Cr.P.), 
and was unable to give notice to the State of an alibi defense as 
required by Section 77-14-2 U.C.A., (1953), as amended. It was 
apparent from the information contained in the public defender's 
Affidavit in Support of his Motion to Vacate, that Defendants 
were going to be denied effective assistance of counsel. The 
Court ruled on the motion on the morning of the trial and improp-
erly denied the motion. Defendant/Appellant Lemon was denied his 
right to effective assistance of counsel in his defense, as 
guaranteed by Amendment VI of the Constitution of the United 
States and as guaranteed by the Constitution of Utah, Article I, 
Section 12. 
SECOND ISSOE: In addition to being denied effective assist-
ance of counsel as a result of the Court's failure to see that 
Defendant Lemon was not prejudiced by the withdrawal of his 
private counsel, or prejudiced by the failure of the Court to 
give newly appointed counsel sufficient time to adequately pre-
pare the defense, Defendant Lemon was denied the effective as-
sistance of counsel because of the failures of the public defend-
er to prepare in a timely manner. A defendant who contends that 
he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel, has the 
burden to persuade the Court that counsel failed in some manner 
to represent his interests, resulting in prejudice to his de-
fense. State v. Forsvthe. 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977). Because 
neither Defendant's private counsel nor the public defender filed 
any motions to suppress evidence in the case, Defendant/Appellant 
Lemon may claim that such failure denied him adequate and effec-
tive assistance of counsel prior to trial. Rule 12, U.R.Cr.P. 
(b) (2) requires that a Motion to Suppress Evidence must be 
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raised, in writing, at least five (5) days prior to trial. No 
such motion was ever filed in Defendant's behalf, even though 
trial testimony shows that the only witness to see a vehicle in 
the vicinity of Ferron, Utah, that matched the description of 
Defendant Seel's vehicle, Deputy Blackburn, did not see Defendant 
Seel' s \~fnicie stopped at the location of any of the burglaries. 
At the time Deputy Blackburn observed the vehicle, he did not 
have any evidence tying that vehicle to the as yet uninvestigated 
burglaries, and did not have probable cause to stop it. When the 
call was sent to Deputy Mangum to instruct him tc stop the vehi-
cle, there is nothing to show that he was told anything other 
than t«^  stop the? vehicle, and stopped it without probable cause 
to beli-ve that the occupants had committed any criminal offense. 
Subsequent stopping, warrantless arrest and warrantless search of 
the vehicle raises a legitimate argument that the Defendants had 
legitimate grounds for a Motion to Suppress any evidence found as 
a result of the stopping, arrest and search cf Defendant Seel's 
vehicle. Whiteiey v. Warden of Wyoming Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 
560, 913 Ct 1031, 28L Eb 2d 301, (1971). The fact that Deputy 
Mangum stopped the Defendants on a rural highway at 4:27 a.m., 
also raises the question of whether anything within the vehicle 
was in plain view and whether Deputy Mangum needed the use of an 
artificial light in order to view the interior of the vehicle. 
Additionally, Deputy Mangum testified at trial that Exhibit 1-A, 
a photograph of the interior of the vehicle, taken with the 
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passenger door open, was taken at approximately 6:00 a.m. on June 
2, 1989. That photograph was taken prior to the issuance of any 
search warrant and prior to the obtaining of any consent to 
search, and thus could be viewed as a further illegal search of 
Defendant Seel's vehicle. State v. Schlosser. 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 
38, 774 P.2d 1132, (Utah 1989), State v\, Terechek. 702 P.2d 1131 
(Or. App. 1985). 
Defendant was also entitled to a Motion to Sever Count V, 
POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED PERSON, but 
because the public defender did not visit Defendant until there 
were less than three (3) working days left before the trial, it 
was too late for the filing of such Motion to Sever. Rule 9, 
U.R.Cr.P., provides that a Motion to Sever must be filed at least 
"five (5) days before trial" or the Defendant's right to sever-
ance offenses is waived. Counsel's failure to timely file the 
Motion to Sever, denied Defendant his right to due process of law 
without a knowing waiver on his part. The evidence necessary to 
prove Count V obviously would have a prejudicial effect on the 
jury's attitude concerning the Defendant's guilt or innocence on 
the other counts contained within the Information. 
In State v^ Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court standard in 
determining ineffectiveness of counsel. "To establish ineffec-
tiveness of counsel under the U.S. Supreme Court standard, a 
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defendant must show, first, that his or her counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which perform-
ance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment, and that counsel's performance prejudiced the defend-
ant." The duty of the public defender to file Motions to 
Suppress and Stiver are actions that effective counsel would 
perform and provide an objective standard by which to measure 
Defendant/Appellant's counsel because there is evidence on the 
trial record that legitimately can support the argument that the 
Defendant may have prevailed on a Motion to Suppress the evidence 
found in the search and would have prevailed on a Motion to Sever 
Count V of the State's Complaint. Counsel's failure to timely 
file those motions and present them before the Court prejudiced 
the Defendant. 
Section 77-14-2, U.C.A., (1953), as amended, requires that 
when a defendant intends to offer evidence of an alibi, not less 
than ten (10) days before trial, he shall "file and serve on the 
prosecuting attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to 
claim alibi." Because the public defender did not even talk to 
the Defendants until less than three (3) working days before 
trial, it was too late for him to file a Notice of Alibi with the 
prosecuting attorney. As damaging was the fact that the public 
defender also did not have time to locate, contact, interview and 
subpoena those alibi witnesses so that he could have them avail-
able to testify at trial. Had they appeared at trial, and testi-
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fied that the Defendant and Co-Defendant were in Frice, Utah, on 
June 2, 1989, at approximately 3:00 a.m., (T. 3 73), their testi-
mony would have rebutted the allegation of the State that these 
two Defendants were committing a burglary at Jeanie's Convenience 
Store and Gas Station at 3:16 a.m. on June 2, 1989, (T. 99). 
Evidence could have then been introduced to show that the dis-
tance between Price, Utah, and Ferron, Utah, is approximately 
forty (40) miles and Defendants would have had to have traveled 
at a speed greater than 120 miles per hour to reach Ferron in 
time to burglarise Jeanie's. If defense counsel had provided 
those alibi witnesses, Defendant/Appellant Seel would not have 
felt "che necessity to testify in his own defense and, coupled 
with a pretrial order by the Court severing Count V, the jury 
would have never been prejudiced by hearing of either Defendant's 
prior criminal history. 
Section 78-7-4, U.C.A., (1953), as amended, provides a 
mechanism whereby the defendant may have ail potential witnesses 
for the State excluded from the courtroom, except when they are 
testifying, and attorneys representing criminal defendants have a 
duty to exclude the State's witnesses to prevent them from hear-
ing each other's testimony and possibly adjusting their own 
testimony so it will conform with the testimony of those who have 
testified before them. It is also advisable for defense counsel 
to exclude witnesses so that State's witnesses can not modify 
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their testimony after taking into consideration the weaknesses in 
the State's ^ase or the obvious direction of defense counsel's 
questions. 
After four 1,4) of the State's witnesses had been called and 
had testified on direct and cross-examination, counsel for the 
Defendants first realized that the State's witnesses were 
communicating with each other concerning the case before the 
Court. It was only then that defense counsel requested that, the 
Court exclude any further potential witnesses from the courtroom, 
noting that, it appeared to defense counsel that "there's quire a 
bit of consultation going on here" (P. 81, Line 20-23). 
Counsel's failure to exclude witnesses provided those witnesses 
with an excellent opportunity to conform their testimony with the 
testimony of previous witnesses and who possibly modified their 
testimony in response to defense counsel's questions to previous 
witnesses and the implied direction of Defendant's defense that 
defense counsel's questions pointed to. 
Finally, Derendant Lemon was denied effective assistance of 
counsel in those instances when defense counsel failed to timely 
object to improper statements made by the prosecutor during his 
closing arguments and failure to request that the Court instruct 
the jury concerning the prosecutor's improper statements. During 
the closing arguments, the prosecutor in referring to the exist-
ence of the firearm, told the jury that, "we could have had a 
dead officer or anything else", (T. 212), when there was no 
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evidence submitted in the course of the trial to support such a 
claim. In fact, the trial testimony was that, even though the 
Defendants had the briefcase within their reach, neither one of 
them ever reached for it nor was the evidence conclusive that 
either of them even knew that the weapon was in the briefcase at 
the time. Deputy Mangum's testimony was that after he stopped 
the vehicle, Defendant/Appellant Seel started to exit the vehicle 
and Deputy Mangum asked him to remain in the vehicle. Deputy 
Mangum then went on to testify that as he approached the vehicle, 
he looked to make sure there were no visible weapons and that he 
was not in any immediate danger. He then went on to testify that 
he left the two Defendants in their vehicle for several minutes, 
while he waited for Deputy Hansen to arrive and there is no 
evidence that either Defendant handled that briefcase or made any 
attempt to remove the firearm from it, although they had an 
excellent opportunity to do so at that time. (T. 68) (T. 74). 
There is no evidence that Defendant Lemon even knew that firearm 
was in the vehicle (T. 161, Line 8-11). Defense counsel did not 
lodge any objection nor ask for any cautionary instruction from 
the Court. Next, even though the Court had previously dismissed 
Count VI, POSSESSION OF AN INSTRUMENT USED FOR BURGLARY OR THEFT, 
(T. 161-164), during the prosecutor's closing arguments, he made 
reference to the existence to burglary tools in the Scout (T. 
213). Again, defense counsel failed to object or ask for a 
cautionary instruction to the jury. Although the State failed to 
produce evidence that the tools caused the damage to the various 
entryways of the various buildings that had been entered, and the 
State's witness acknowledged on cross-examination, that no foren-
sic tests had been made to establish the fact that those tools 
were consistent with the damage done, (T. 97) (T. 114-115), the 
prosecutor argued to the jury that the tools found in Defendant 
Seel's vehicle were consistent with the damage that was done to 
the entryways, (T. 214), but no objection was made by defense 
counsel. During Deputy Blackburn's testimony, (T. 53), the 
Deputy testified that he saw the glare of headlights as he turned 
north on Highway 10 and that as he proceeded north they were 
coming towards him (T. 54). However, in closing arguments, the 
prosecutor misstated Deputy Blackburn's testimony as being that 
the Deputy "saw the lights at the store pointing east before it 
turned south on State Street and headed south on State Road 10." 
(T. 216). The implication of such argument is that Defendant 
Seel's vehicle was parked by the side of the Ferron Drug Store, 
rather than traveling down the main north-south highway through 
the middle of town. Again defense counsel did not object. After 
defense counsel's closing arguments, the prosecutor again took 
the floor, and argued to the jury that the Defendant was not 
being truthful, citing facts not in evidence. (T. 226-227). 
Then again, during the prosecutor's second argument before the 
jury, he again misrepresented Deputy Blackburn's testimony where 
34 
he first saw the headlights when he turned north on Elighway U-10, 
(T. 228), and then argued that the vehicle was stationary. (T. 
229). He then told the jury that Defendant/Appellant SeeTs 
vehicle "pulls to the right and heads down Main Street.H (T. 
229). During the entire course of the prosecutor's arguments, 
defense counsel failed to object to any of the improper state-
ments made by the prosecutor and his failure to do so denied 
Defendant/Appellant the effective assistance of counsel. 
THIRD ISSUE: Rule 9, U.R.Cr.P. (d), provides that in those 
cases where the defendant may be prejudiced by joinder of of-
fenses, "the court shall order an election of separate trials of 
separate counts, or grant the severance of defendants, or provide 
such other relief as justice requires.0 Count V of the State's 
Information, alleging POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A 
RESTRICTED PERSON, was not part of the same criminal episode as 
the other charges contained in the Information and additionally, 
would be prejudicial to the Defendant in any event because, the 
evidence to support such an allegation includes proof that the 
Defendant has previously been convicted of a felony. If such 
information is presented to a jury, it almost certainly would 
have the effect of causing the jury to believe it is more likely 
than not that the Defendant, having previously committed a felo-
ny, also committed the offenses with which he is charged in the 
instant Information. Although defense counsel failed to timely 
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file a Motion to Sever as has been discussed above, and under the 
general rule failed to preserve this issue for appeal, this is a 
plain or manifest error appearing on the fact of the record and 
to the manifest prejudice of the accused and the Court should 
consider this issue even though defense counsel failed to object 
before or during trial. State v. Cobo, and State v. Bullock, 
supra. The Court's failure to sever, on its own motion, denied 
Defendant/Appellant his right to due process of law and his right 
to be tried before an impartial jury. The standard in determin-
ing the error of the court is reversible error, is whether there 
is a reasonable probability that, the result with severance would 
be different, State v. Howitt. 140 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah App. 
1990). Certainly, taken together with the argument that a proper 
defense would have included Defendants' alibi defense and the 
severance of Court V precluding the prosecution from introducing 
evidence of Defendants' prior criminal history, Defendants' case 
would have been sufficient without the necessity of either De-
fendant taking the stand to testify in his own behalf to reach a 
result other than the one arrived by the jury. 
FOURTH ISSUE: The Court concluded that constrictive posses-
sion of the firearm was sufficient to show "possession" under the 
meaning of Section 76-6-203, U.C.A., (1953), as amended. Howev-
er, the Court erred by misinterpreting the construction of the 
statute and attaching a meaning to the word "possesses'1 that was 
not intended by the legislature. Section 76-6-203, U.C.A., 
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(1953), as amended, denotes use of a weapon in some manner while 
committing or fleeing from a burglary, such as "uses", "threat-
ens", or "attempts to use." The word "possesses", preceded and 
followed by the disjunctive "or", indicates legislative intent 
that the word "possesses" be of equal gravity with the words and 
phrases "uses", "threatens", or "attempts to use", and does not 
include circumstances where the weapon was never even held by the 
Defendant and plays no part in the Defendant's activities in 
attempting, committing or fleeing from a burglary. In State of 
Utah, Tn the Interest of J . L . S ., a person under eighteen (18) 
years of age, 610 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1980), the court in interpret-
ing similar language in Section 76-5-404 (1), determined that 
when conduct set forth in general terms is connected with specif-
ic conduct prescribed by the statute by the disjunctive "or" it 
is indicative of an intent to make the type of conduct referred 
to by the general term of equal gravity with that conduct re-
ferred to in the more specific terms. Hence, constructive pos-
session of a firearm, much less simply being in the presence of a 
firearm without knowledge of its existence, does not arise to the 
level of conduct equated with using, threatening or attempting to 
use a dangerous weapon while committing or fleeing from a bur-
glary. If constructive possession of a firearm is sufficient to 
create an aggravating circumstance which elevates burglary to 
aggravated burglary, then any burglar who owns or possesses a 
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firearm, nut leaving it at his home, is guilty of aggravated 
burglary when he travels to a distant location and burglarizes 
someone's property. Defendant Lemon is entitled to the 
Court's consideration of an additional argument to that of De-
fendant Seel. At the end of the State's case, when the Court was 
considering various motions of defense counsel for dismissal or 
reduction of Count I-IV, and Count V, and the counter arguments 
of the prosecutor, the Court erroneously decided that the accom-
plice statute, Section 76-2-202, U.C.A., (1953), as amended, 
sufficiently covered Mr. Lemon's activities to allow the jury to 
consider whether Mr. Lemon was guilty of aggravated burglary, not 
withstanding the Court's conclusion that there was no evidence to 
show that Mr. Lemon had any knowledge of the existence of the 
firearm in the vehicle, (T. 161, Line 8-11), and concluded that 
the accomplice statute did not apply to Mr. Lemon on Count V 
because of his Icick of knowledge. However, the accomplice stat-
ute, Section 76-2-202, requires the very mental state that the 
Court found lacking in Mr. Lemon when it dismissed Count V. If 
the mental state required to commit the offense of aggravated 
burglary does not exist because there is no evidence to show that 
Defendant Lemon even knew the firearm was present in the vehicle, 
he cannot be held accountable for what Defendant Seel may have 
known. The Court correctly applied the standard for the accom-
plice statute on Count V (T. 160, Line 13-20), but incorrectly 
applied it as to Defendant Lemon on Counts I-IV. 
38 
The Court erred when it failed to grant defense counsel's 
motion at the end of the presentation of the State's case and 
should have reduced Counts I-IV from Aggravated Burglary to 
Burglary of a Non-Dwelling. 
FIFTH ISSUE: Defendant claims that prosecutorial miscon-
duct prejudiced his right to a fair trial because the prosecutor 
misrepresented the evidence in his closing arguments to the jury, 
thereby improperly influencing the jury, (see Discussion of 
Prosecutorial Misconduct in Detail of the Argument, Second 
Issue). For prosecutorial misconduct to be reversible error, 
Defendant must show that there is " a reasonable likelihood that 
in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result" 
State v, Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551, (Utah 1987). An isolated 
misconduct, by itself, is not sufficient to sustain reversible 
error, either. Only with repeated or extensive improper com-
ments, will the Court find prosecutorial misconduct that warrants 
reversal. State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1181, 1206 (Utah 1934). 
During closing arguments in this case, the prosecutor for 
the State misstated facts and testimony several times, presented 
facts and opinions not in evidence, and reminded the jury of the 
claim that these Defendants possessed burglary tools even though 
the Court had ruled that no evidence had been presented to justi-
fy the assertion that the tools found in Defendant's possession 
were burglary tools. The prosecutor used the argument that the 
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Defendants possessed burglary tools tu contradict 
Defendant/Appellant's defense and to claim that, Co-Defendant Seel 
was lying when he testified. When reference is made to tools as 
"burglary tools" in a case where the defendant is charged with 
"burglary", the implication that defendant possessed tools pecul-
iarly suited for use in committing burglaries has a strong impact 
on the minds of the jurors and is likely to convince them that a 
person who possesses "burglary tool ID" also is likely to commit 
burglaries. 
Because there were repeated and extensive improper comments 
by the prose ^ T.or, and because the i ^  is a reasonable likelihood 
that, in the absence of those comments Defendant, may have ortailed 
a more favoral le result, the misconduct by the prosecutor should 
be found to be reversible error. 
Normally, when the defendant fails to object, he waives his 
right to raise such issues on appeal. However, when the errors 
are plain and made to appear "on the face of the record and to 
the manifest prejudice of the accused . . .", State v. Jubo
 t 
supra, the Court may consider that issue. When prosecutorial 
misconduct is also the duty of the court to stop the proceedings, 
instruct the prosecutor to discontinue the conduct and admonish 
the jury concerning the matter. While neither the defense coun-
sel nor the judge interfered with the actions of the prosecutor, 
their failure to act should not "be the cause of one's going to 
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prison", State v. Bullock, supra. 
SIXTH ISSUE: In the process of introducing Exhibits 11-19, 
the State failed to introduce evidence or opinion testimony 
sufficient to justify introduction and admission of those exhib-
its as burglary tools. Although the State's witness repeatedly 
made comments that the various exhibits could be used ' as a 
burglary tool", (T. 103-106), the State failed xo lay a proper 
foundation for the proper introduction of those exhibits. 
Over defense counsel's objections, however, the Court 
admitted those exhibits into evidence and subsequent to those 
exhibits being received into evidence, they were placed before 
the jury for the jury to observe and view. They were referred to 
throughout the course of the trial as "burglary tools" and uhe 
obvious implication is that a person in possession of "burglary 
tools" is very likely to be a person who commits burglaries. 
After the State rested, the Court, upon its own motion, ruled 
that no evidence had been introduced to support a claim that 
those tools were burglary tools under the meaning of Section 
76-6-205, U.C.A., (1953), as amended. Since the Court concluded 
on its own that the State had not presented any evidence to 
support Count VI, it was manifest error for the Court to admit 
Exhibits 11-19. When the Court initially admitted those tools 
into evidence as being "burglary tools", the jury was prejudiced 
in hearing the evidence, seeing the evidence admitted as being 
proof of possessing "burglary tools" and having those tools 
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placed within the view of the jury. Because there is a reasona-
ble likelihood that the Defendant may have obtained a more fa-
vorable result in the absence of the introduction of those items 
int>o evidence, their introduction is reversible error. 
42 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant is entitled to have his convictions herein re-
versed and the entire case returned to x,he District Court for 
further proceedings. Additionally, if the Court concludes that 
there is insufficient evidence on the record to support 
Defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel, the Court may remand the matter to the District Court 
for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. After the District 
Court has tak^n testimony in evidence on that issue, if the 
District Court aoes not rule that Defendant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel, the record should contain enough informa-
tion for Defendant to appeal the District Court's decision on 
•chat issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, T H T S ^ S ^ DAY OF JULY, 1991. 
KEITH H. CHIARA 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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Thereof to: 
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ALLEN S. THORPE #3254 
Emery County Public Defender 
98 East Main Street 
P.O. Box 1238 
Castle Dale, UT 84513 
(801)381-5110 
Attorney for the Defendant 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT'COURT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL DUANE SEEL and ] 
GLENN LEMON, 
Defendant. 
i AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
i IN SUPPORT OF 
i MOTION TO VACATE TRIAL 
Criminal No. 89 CR 2303 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Emery ) 
Allen S. Thorpef being first duly sworn upon his oath to 
testify truthfullyf now, hereby deposes as follows: 
1. That he is the Emery County Public Defender and counsel 
of record for the Defendant hereinf having been appointed on 
September 6, 1989. 
2. That jury trial herein had previously been set for 
September 2*, 1989, and your affiant, at the time of his 
appointment felt that there would be adequate time to prepare for 
such trial, based upon the information known to him at that time. 
3. That your affiant was required to prepare for two jury 
trials in other cases prior to the trial date set in this case. 
4. That, on or about September 20, 1989, your affiant met 
with the Defendants at the Emery County Detention Center and 
learned for the first time that they desired to claim in part a 
defense of alibi, and was given the names of numerous witnesses 
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they desire to call in their defense, 
5. That, your affiant is unable, in the short time before 
trial to locate, interview and evaluate the testimony of the 
witnesses named by the Defendants. 
6. That, your affiant is further unable to give notice to 
the State as required by Section 77-14-2 CT.C.A. (1953), as 
amended, because of the short notice he himself received of the 
existence of the aforesaid witnesses. 
7. That, when first informed of the existence of said 
witnesses, your affiant asked the Defendants why there was 
nothing about them in their case file, to which they replied that 
their previous counsel had never asked them about potential 
witnesses or explained the necessity of giving such notice, 
wherefore, your affiant verily believes that this information was 
not withheld in bad faith or for the purpose of delay. 
Dated this day of September, 1989. 
Allen S. Thorpe 
Emery County Public Defender 
Signed and sworn to before me this day of September, 
1989. 
Notary Public 
ALLEN S. THORPE #3254 
Emery County Public Defender 
98 East Main Street 
P.O. Box 1238 
Castle Dale, UT 84513 
(801)381-5110 
Attorney for the Defendants 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
MICHAEL DUANE SEEL and ] 
GLENN LEMON, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) MOTION TO VACATE TRIAL 
I Criminal No. 89 CR 2303 
COME NOW THE DEFENDANTS, by and through their counsel of 
record, Allen S. Thorpe, and move this Court to vacate the Jury 
Trial set for September 2£\ 1989 on the grounds that their 
counsel, having been recently appointed, will be unable to 
adequately prepare for trial. This motion is suported by the 
Affidavit of Defendants1 Counsel, 
DATED this^i^^ay of September, 1989. 
Allen S. Tho^e 
Emery County Public Defender 
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL, JUDGE 
John Greenig, Court Reporter 
July 6, 1989 - 10:00 a.m. 
Criminal No. 934 
TITLE: 
STATE OF UTAH, 
V. 
Plaintiff, 
DARRELL RAYMOND HEDDING, 
Defendant. 
Proceedings Before the Court: 
ATTORNEY(S): 
Scott N. Johansen 
Allen S. Thorpe 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Arraignment 
This matter came before the Court for Arraignment. The State v:as represented 
by County Attorney, Scott N. Johansen. The defendant was present together 
with Attorney, Allen S. Thorpe. To the information, the defendant entered a 
plea of "NOT GUILTY" to all counts. This matter is set for Trial to a Jury on 
Thursday, September 7,1989, at 9:30 a.m. for two days. Defense counsel made a 
motion for reduction of bail to 32,000. Court denied the morion and fixed bail 
at $5,000. 
BRUCE C. FUNK, CLERK 
BY: J. WINN, DEPUTY CLERK 
BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE 
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SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
a 
HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL, JUDGE September £, 1989 - 10:00 a.m. 
John Greenig, Court Reporter Criminal No. 934 
TITLE: ATTORNEY(S): 
STATE OF UTAH, Scott N. Johansen 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DARRELL RAYMOND HEDDING, Allen S. Thorpe 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Proceedings Before the Court: Jury Trial 
This was the date and hour fixed for Trial in this matter. The State was 
represented by County Attorney, Scott N. Johansen. The defendant was present 
together with Attorney, Allen S. Thorpe. 
A jury panel was duly notified and present in Court. Sixteen jurors were 
selected and sworn on voir dire. The Court excused William Luce and Wallace R. 
Curtis for cause. Two more jurors were selected and sworn on voir dire. 
Counsel made their pre-emptory challenges and the following jurors were 
selected to serve as trial jurors: Christel Farabee, Sue Jones, Colleen 
Jorgensen, Elnora K. Jensen, Kathryn Jones, Sonja Bassett, Lynda Baker and 
Cynthia Collete. 
The jurors were administered the oath to try the case. The information was 
read and the plea of the defendant stated. 
The Court admonished the jury as to proper conduct and Court recessed at 10:20 
a.m. and reconvened at 10:30 a.m. with all parties present. 
Counsel informed the Court that the defendant would like to change his plea. 
To Counts I and II of the information, the defendant entered a plea of 
"GUILTY". The Court determined that the defendant was fully aware of his legal 
and constitutional rights and having waived those rights, the plea of Guilty 
was entered. On motion of the State and good cause appearing therefore, the 
Court orders Counts III and IV dismissed. 
This matter is referred to State Corrections for a presentence investigation 
and report and is continued to Tuesday, October 3, 1989, at 9:30 a.m. for 
pronouncement of judgment. The Court will continue the present bail 
arrangements. 
BRUCE C. FUNK, CLERK 
BY: J. WINN, DEPUTY CLERK 
BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE 
• m t SEVE.N7H jui: - rr r:— .. 
Scott Johansen #1703 
Emery County Attorney 
P. 0. Box 1099 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513 
Telephone: (801) 381-2543 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM LESLIE ROLLINS 
DOB 09/17/50 
Defendant. , 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
1 TO STATE PRISON 
) Criminal No. 937 
The above-named Defendant appeared on September 19, 1989, 
for a jury trial in the above matter, tcgether with his attorney, 
Allen S. Thorpe, and having been found Guilty as follows: Count 
I, Theft, a Second-Degree Felony; Count II, Burglary of a 
Vehicle, a Class A Misdemeanor; Count III, Unlawful Possession of 
a Dangerous Weapon, a Third-Degree Felony; Count IV, No Valid 
Operator's License, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Count V, Open 
Container of Alcoholic Beverage in a Vehicle, a Class B Mis-
demeanor, and having advised the Court that he had no legal 
reason to state why judgment should not be pronounced, and the 
Court being fully advised in the premises; 
IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT that the said 
WILLIAM LESLIE ROLLINS, on Count I serve a term in the Utah State 
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Prison of NOT LESS THAN ONE (1) YEAR, NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN (15) 
YEARS; on Count II, serve a term in the Emery County Detention 
Center of one (1) year; on Count III, serve a term in the Utah 
State Prison of NOT TO EXCEED (5) YEARS; on Count IV, serve a 
term in the Emery County Detention Center of thirty (30) days; 
and on Count V, serve a term in the Emery County Detention Center 
of six (6) months. Said terms of incarceration are to run 
concurrently, with credit given for tine served since June 16, 
1989. 
You, the said WILLIAM LESLIE ROLLINS, are hereby rendered 
into the custody of the Sheriff of Emery County, State of Utah, 
to be by him delivered into the custody of the Warden or other 
proper officer of said State Prison. 
DATED this ^ _6£. d aY o f September, 1989. 
BUNNELL / 
s^tric^ x Courx: ^ Jjjidge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the _S£-&Cav of September, 1989, I 
mailed a true and correct unexecuted copy of the foregoing 
Judgment by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to Defendant's attorney as follows: 
Allen S. Thorpe 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 1238 
Castle Dale, Utah 8 4 5 1 3 
Secretary 
7.; a 
Recorded in Judgment ftecprd 
. atPagP OV-. 
BRUCE C. FUNK, Clerk 
